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ABSTRACT
The passage of the America Invents Act in 2011 ushered in a new
era of patent procurement, enforcement, and litigation far different
from what came before. Three new trial-like review procedures allow
administrative challenges to the patentability of issued patents,
including inter partes review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR), and
covered business method post-grant review (CBM). A majority of the
challenges have thus far been brought by defendants accused of
infringing the patents they then sought to challenge, seeking to move
the dispute to the Patent Office from the district court. Which begs
the question: Do these procedures change the law of related district
court stays? Analyzing early motions to stay pending IPR, PGR, and
CBM, we answer that question in the affirmative.
"By requiring courts to apply this limited and relatively consistent body
of caselaw when determining whether to grant a stay, subsection [(b)(2)]
should ensure predictability and stability in stay decisions across different
district courts, and limit the incentive to forum shop." - 157 Cong. Rec.
S1380 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
"(b)(2) REVIEW--A party may take an immediate interlocutory
appeal from a district court's decision under paragraph (1). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall review the district
court's decision to ensure consistent application of established precedent,
and such review may be de novo." - Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
§ 18(b)(2) (2011)
I. INTRODUCTION
Patent litigation is expensive. High-and low-stakes business
disputes that reach the point of litigation can cost both parties, and
result in time, money, and effort expended. For over twenty years,
Congress has sought a lower-cost alternative to patent litigation by
allowing the Patent Office (PTO) to take a fresh look at challenged
patents through a process known as reexamination. The recent rise of
third-party enforcement entities-variously called non-practicing
entities (NPEs), patent enforcement entities (PAEs), patent
aggregators, or pejoratively, patent trolls-coupled with trial damages
sometimes topping billions provided further political and rhetorical
drive for Congress to again get involved. Complaints about patent
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quality and abstraction, particularly as it relates to computer
programming and technology, likewise fueled debate. In response,
Congress enacted the America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011, giving the
PTO further power to review the patentability of issued patents
through new procedures, such as inter partes review, post-grant
review, and covered business method post-grant review.
Part of the widely acknowledged power of these new PTO
proceedings lies in avoiding the costly litigation that often acts as a
leveraging weight pressuring defendants to settle instead of arguing
patent validity in district court. But for these PTO proceedings to
provide cost-saving benefits, they must resolve patentability questions
before the parties engage in the discovery, trial, and appeal of district-
court litigation.
Enter stays. With the inherent ability to control their own
dockets, federal district courts have long had the ability to stay cases
for a variety of reasons. With the rise of PTO parallel proceedings,
the courts have developed a body of law to deal with and apply the
courts' inherent power to manage parallel disputes. Specialized
provisions of the AIA that directly influence, and bear on, that law-
the law of stays-further complicate any district court judge's analysis.
One important provision-of § 18 of the AIA-was meant to
deal with stays from a small subset of challenged patents, Covered
Business Method (CBM) patents. It included a strong stay provision
with an interlocutory appeal directly to the Federal Circuit, allowing
for a de novo review. It also imposed a four-factor test-of which
three of those factors are the federal district court's test for whether to
grant a stay generally. These interlocutory appeals have quickly
generated precedential case law from the Federal Circuit that has
influenced the predictability and practice of seeking stays in view of
PTAB proceedings.
In this article, we discuss the District Courts' stay authority, the
development of parallel proceedings at the PTO, historical examples
of stays in light of ex parte and inter partes reexam, and the statutory
stay provisions provided for in the AIA. We analyze decisions to
date-from district courts and the Federal Circuit-to understand
how the courts may approach future fact requests for stays pending
PTAB review of litigated patents. In doing so, we offer
recommendations for seeking and securing stays.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. District Court Article III and Stay Authority
The ability to stay litigation in an Article III district court springs
from the court's inherent docket-control power.1 That "power to stay
proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of
time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." 2 District court
judges weigh the parties' competing interests and seek balance.
3
Courts have long had discretion depending on the facts of the case to
4
stay judicial proceedings pending reexamination of a patent. As we
see, this also applies to stays of district court litigation related to
PTAB reviews.
B. The Reexamination of Issued Patents
For almost two hundred years, the PTO had no authority to
cancel issued patents. 5 Many other patent jurisdictions have had post-
grant review of patents for over a century-for instance, in the
English system, since 1883.6 That changed in the U.S. on July 1, 1981,
when laws providing for ex parte reexamination of issued patents
went into effect.7 '8
1 See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (finding that this necessarily
implies that district courts also have the ability to modify or lift a stay if no longer
deemed efficient or equitable); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) ("The
District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to
control its own docket.").
2 Landis, 299 U.S. at 254.
3 Id. at 254-55.
4 See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1426-27 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Courts
have inherent power to manage their dockets and stay proceedings, including the
authority to order a stay pending conclusion of a PTO reexamination.") (internal
citation omitted).
5 McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. C. Aultman & Co., 169 U.S. 606, 608
(1898) ("It has been settled by repeated decisions of this court that when a patent has
received the signature of the secretary of the interior, countersigned by the
commissioner of patents, and has had affixed to it the seal of the patent office, it has
passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of that office...").
6 See Zorina Khan, An Economic History of Patent Institutions, BOWDOIN
COLLEGE, (Mar. 19, 2015) http://eh.net/encyclopedia/an-economic-history-of-patent-
institutions/ [http://perma.cc/5AED-S8V5].
7 See MPEP § 2201 (9th ed. 2015): Statutory basis for citation of prior art patents
or printed publications in patent files and reexamination of patents became available
on July 1, 1981, as a result of new sections 301-307 of title 35 United States Code
which were added by Public Law 96-517 enacted on December 12, 1980 . . . . On
November 29, 1999, Public Law 106-113 was enacted, and expanded reexamination by
providing an "inter partes" option. Public Law 106-113 authorized the extension of
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Ex parte reexamination permitted patentees to bolster the
patentability of an issued patent over prior art that surfaced after
examination had concluded.9 Third parties could also ask the PTO to
reexamine a patent, providing them a way to challenge the
patentability of a patent without district court litigation.
When implemented, the exparte reexamination process was seen
as an alternative to litigation. Congress stated in 1980 that:
Reexamination will permit efficient resolution of questions
about the validity of issued patents without recourse to
expensive and lengthy infringement litigation . . . .The
reexamination of issued patents could be conducted with a
fraction of the time and cost of formal legal proceedings
and would help restore confidence in the effectiveness of
our patent system .... It is anticipated that these measures
provide a useful and necessary alternative for challengers
and for patent owners to test the validity of United States
patents in an efficient and relatively inexpensive manner. °
One Congressman hoped reexamination was to "be of great
benefit to small businesses for defending their patents."" In
Congressional hearings that eventually led to the creation of
reexamination, then-Commissioner Sidney Diamond stated:
Reexamination would eliminate or simplify a significant
amount of patent litigation. In some cases, the PTO would
conclude as a result of reexamination that a patent should
not hiave issued. A certain amount of litigation over
validity and infringement thus would be completely
avoided. 2
As its name suggests, the reexamination framework that came
reexamination proceedings via an optional inter partes reexamination procedure in
addition to the present ex parte reexamination. 35 U.S.C. 311-318 are directed to the
optional inter partes reexamination procedures. (Internal citations omitted).
8 See Wayne B. Paugh, The Betrayal of Patent Reexamination: An Alternative
to Litigation, Not a Supplement, 19 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 177, 181-188 (2009).
9 See H.R. REP. No. 112-98, at 45 (2011).
10 H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460,
6462-63.
11 126 CONG. REP. 29,901 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1980) (statement of Rep.
Hollenbeck).
12 See Patent Reexamination: Hearings on S. 1679 Before the Senate Comm. On
the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 15-16 (1979) (statement of Comm'r Diamond).
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into being in 1981 was an ex parte affair-even if a third party
requested reexamination of a patent, only the PTO and the patentee
participated in the reexamination after institution. Perhaps because
of this limitation, third parties used reexaminations less than expected
during the 1980s and 1990s.
Hoping to further bolster patent litigation alternatives, Congress
created inter partes reexamination (IPX) in 1999. Inter partes
requests could only be filed by third parties (or in rare cases ordered
by the Commissioner of Patents). Both the requester and the patent
owner participated in inter partes reexamination proceedings, making
them more attractive to parties hoping to challenge a patent.
Both exparte and inter partes reexamination let an examiner re-
open a case file and reexamine an issued patent in light of new
evidence relevant to patentability. 13  A specialized Central
Reexamination Unit (CRU) handled requests from patent owners or
third parties and conducted reexaminations. 4 Current and former
reexaminations are on-the-papers exchanges, with no possibility for
district-court-style discovery or oral argument before appeal.
Both proceedings led to requests for stays in related litigations.
Early decisions like Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg held that the district courts
had the inherent power to-and were particularly justified in-staying
patent cases in light of pending office proceedings. 15  Historical
statistics show that such stay requests were successful roughly 60% of
the time.16  During the AIA debates, Congressmen noted that
reexamination has provided "a less costly way of removing or
restricting patents that should not have been granted or that were
granted too broadly, to permit such challenge even before litigation-
inducing controversy has arisen."'
' 7
Data from the PTO shows that requesters have used the pre-
AIA types of reexamination-in particular inter partes
reexamination-in addition to litigation, instead of as a litigation
13 Greg H. Gardella & Emily A. Berger, United States Reexamination
Procedures: Recent Trends, Strategies and Impact on Patent Practice, 8 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 381, 382 (2009).
14 Id. The Commissioner of Patents can also order reexamination sua sponte.
Though this practice had fallen out of favor, one reexamination was ordered in 2011.
15 Quigg, 849 F.2d at 1426-27 (request for stay pending inter partes
reexamination).
16 See, e.g., Rates for Motions to Stay Pending Reexamination, DOCKET
NAVIGATOR (2014), http://home.docketnavigator.com/year-review/
[http://perma.cc/LX97-6TV9] (showing between 51.2 and 61.3 of district courts
granted stays pending reexaminations prior to the AIA).
17 In re Construction Equipment Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
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alternative.' 8 In fact, about 70% of inter partes reexamination
requests parallel district-court litigation between the same, or related,
parties.19 Due in part to no statutory deadline for reaching decisions,
as well as the availability of internal PTO appeals, both ex parte and
inter partes reexamination were often protracted-typically lasting
multiple years-before reaching a final written decision.
C. New Patent Office Proceedings
Congress meant the AIA's new statutory post-grant review
procedures to be "quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation.' 20
The AIA introduced new patent trials to be held before a newly
named Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), like inter partes
review (IPR) and post-grant review (PGR), both of which went into
effect on September 16, 2012. Section 18 of the AIA, titled
"Transitional Program for Covered business Method Patents,"
established a subset of PGR proceedings for "covered business
method patents" (CBM). 2' CBM proceedings are, for the purposes of
this background section, treated similarly to PGR proceedings.22
Procedurally, IPR, PGR, and CBM replace the paper
administration of inter partes reexamination with a trial conducted by
a panel of three administrative patent judges-complete with limited
discovery, deposition, and an oral argument. They shift the burden
from the PTO to the petitioner to show unpatentability.
23
18 See Paugh, supra note 12, at 181-88.
19 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION
FILING DATA - SEPTEMBER 30, 2011, at 3,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/inter-parte-historicalstats-roll-up-EOY2013.pdf
[http://perma.cc/KCT2-W2XP].
See H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011) (statutory post-grant review
procedures were designed to be "quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation");
157 CONG. REC. S952 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (inter partes review was intended to
provide a "faster, less costly alternatives to civil litigation to challenge patents")
(statement of Sen. Grassley).
21 Because § 18 is scheduled to sunset after eight years, it is not codified in title
35, but is rather a floating statute.
22 AIA § 18(a)(1) specifies that CBMs "shall be regarded as, and shall employ the
standards and procedures of, a post-grant review under chapter 32 of title 35," with
some exceptions.
23 See 157 Cong. Rec. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
("One important structural change made by the present bill is that inter partes
reexamination is converted into an adjudicative proceeding in which the petitioner,
rather than the Office, bears the burden of showing unpatentability.").
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1. IPR
IPR trials-like their district court counterparts-seek the "the
just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding., 24 The
AIA requires that the PTAB issue a final determination in no more
than a year post-institution, extendable by six months for good cause.
To institute an IPR proceeding, parties must first petition the Board,
and the patent owner may optionally respond to why the petition
should not be instituted; then the Board will determine if the petition
supporting the ground demonstrates there is a reasonable likelihood
that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is
unpatentable.,
25
IPRs thus change the standard for institution: requests for
reexamination before the enactment of the AIA were instituted when
prior art patents or printed publications presented a "substantial new
question of patentability." IPR expands the body of challengeable
26patents, 6 and eliminates a step in the appeals process, appealing
directly to the Federal Circuit. They expand estoppel, and allow for
deposition of expert witnesses and other limited discovery.
2. PGR and CBM
PGRs and CBMs are procedurally congruent with IPRs, with
some key substantive and timing differences. Unlike IPRs, parties can
only petition for PGR during the first nine months after the Office
grants (or reissues) a patent.27 With the exception of business method
patents and pending interferences, PGR only applies to patents with a
priority date later than March 15, 2013, i.e., patents that contain a
claim with an effective filing date that is on or after March 16, 2013. A
petition to institute PGR may be filed by anyone other than the owner
of the patent.2 8
Section 18 of the AIA created a special type of post-grant
review-creating a transitional program for challenging covered
business method (CBM) patents. Congress intended CBMs to be an
accessible, low-cost procedure for companies to challenge broad,
abstract patents of questionable patentability related to the financial
24 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b) (2014).
25 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) (2014).
26 The current regime precludes reexamination of patents filed before Nov. 1,
1999.
27 See 35 U.S.C. § 321(c) (2012); 37 C.F.R § 42.202 (2014).
28 See 35 U.S.C. § 321(a) (2012); 37 C.F.R § 42.201 (2014).
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industry.29 CBM reviews can be filed any time after issue provided
they meet other factors. Any party threatened or sued on a covered
patent may pursue a CBM petition. The petition should state relief
sought, list material facts, and include their entire argument.30 It may
raise any statutory grounds for invalidity-§§ 101, 102, 103, and 112
challenges.
3. Congress Designed the Expedited Timeframe for IPRs and
PGRs under the AIA to Be Shorter Than Litigation
"Those who make the worst use of their time are the first to complain
of its brevity. " 31
Unlike reexaminations, both IPRs and PGRs are statutorily
required to be completed one year after institution. After a petition
has been filed, and a filing date has been accorded, the Patent Owner
may file a preliminary patent owner response 32 within three months.
The PTAB generally issues a decision on institution within three
months of the Patent Owner response, or the three months passing
with no response filed. The statutory twelve-month period for
completing the proceeding runs from this institution decision.
Once an IPR or PGR is instituted, parties receive limited
discovery generally confined to depositions of expert witnesses and
information inconsistent with the positions adopted by the opposing
party.33 The Board may grant limited additional discovery, subject to
the discretion of the assigned panel, on topics like real-party-in-
interest. The Patent Owner may file one motion to amend as a matter
of right, although amendments have thus far met with limited success.
After six to seven months, the parties usually have an oral hearing
with the Board (if requested) and, roughly three to five months after
that, the Board issues a final written decision. If the Board amends or
cancels claims, petitioners must wait until the patent owner exhausts
or waives appeal to the Federal Circuit for the office to issue a
certificate of correction cancelling or amending those claims.
The AIA requires that the final written decision issue no later
29 See generally Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America
Invents Act: Part II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 632 (2012).
30 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.22 (2014).
31 JEAN DE LA BRUYERE, THE CHARACTERS, OR THE MANNERS OF THE AGE 363
(1688).
32 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (2014).
33 See 37 CFR §42.51(b) (2014); Garmin Int'l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs, LLC,
No. IPR2012-00001, Paper 26, at 6-7 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2013).
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than one year after institution, although the Director may extend that
by six months for good cause-which, at the time of writing, had not
yet happened-or the Board may adjust that timeframe, in the case of
joinder.34 That PTAB proceedings are virtually guaranteed to be
completed within 18 months-far faster than most district courts-is
important when analyzing stays. Moreover, JPRs and PGRs are
conducted before the PTAB, not the Central Reexamination Unit
(CRU), and thus their decisions may be appealed directly to the
Federal Circuit, eliminating a step in the appeals process.
4. Congress Sought to Prevent Parties from Bringing the Same
Arguments to Both the PTAB and District Court via Estoppel
"[T]he myth, the wicked lie, that the past is always tense and the
future, perfect. " 35
Unlike ex parte reexamination, if the Board initiates one of the
new post-grant proceedings and issues a final written decision, the
statute estops the petitioner from raising some patentability
arguments before the Board, in federal courts, or the ITC. The scope
of estoppel varies by the type of proceeding, but all types attach when
the PTAB issues the final written decision.
For IPRs, Congress added a strong estoppel provision, § 315(e),
which applies both an inter-office estoppel (§ 315(e)(1)) and a
broader external estoppel (§ 315(e)(2)), applying specifically to
district court and ITC proceedings. These provisions attach at "final
written decision" and prevent the petitioner from raising any ground
the petitioner "raised or reasonably could have raised during that
inter partes review.",36 While what a petitioner "raised or reasonably
could have raised" will likely be litigated, practitioners generally err
on the side of caution, and bring unpatentability challenges based on
the best available known art, likely fearing that the estoppel provision
will bar any opportunity to bring additional invalidity challenges
34 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 302 (2011).
35 ZADIE SMITH, WHITE TEETH 448 (2000).
36 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) (2012). But see 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (2012) (making an
exception to the one-year deadline for IPRs by a period for "not more than 6 months"
for "good cause shown" but the Director may "adjust the time periods in this
paragraph in the case of joinder under section 315(c).") (emphasis added);
37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c) (2014) ("An inter partes review proceeding shall be
administered such that pendency before the Board after institution is normally no
more than one year. The time can be extended by up to six months for good cause by
the Chief Administrative Patent Judge, or adjusted by the Board in the case of
joinder.") (emphasis added).
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elsewhere.
The AIA also precludes anyone who has filed for declaratory
judgment on invalidity or been served with a complaint of
infringement more than a year prior from requesting an IPR.37 This
provision, coupled with the PTO's discretion to stay, transfer,
consolidate, or terminate additional concurrent proceedings before
the PTO complicates disputes.38
Similarly, the stature precludes CBM petitioners from
reasserting invalidity grounds they "raised or reasonably could have
raised" in future PTO proceedings. 39 And, following the issuance of a
final written decision, the petitioner cannot raise invalidity positions
that were "raised during that [CBM] proceeding" in district-court or
ITC proceedings. 40 The bar on declaratory judgment actions for
invalidity also applies to CBMs.
The estoppel described above applies by statute not only to the
actual petitioning party, but also to real-parties-in-interest and any
privies of the petitioning party. It is important to consider who the
statute will estop from bringing invalidity challenges in the district
court after a PTAB proceeding concludes. Often, the willingness of
non-petitioning co-defendants in court litigation to agree to be bound
by a petitioning defendant's eventual estoppel increases the likelihood
of a district court granting the stay.4 '
III. DISTRICT COURT STAYS IN LIGHT OF IPR, PGR, AND CBM
"It is true that the stay provisions for CBM review are statutory, while
the stay practice for inter partes has been developed by the courts. However,
the standards for granting stay relief are generally similar .... The overlap
between the standards for granting a stay in those two contexts is not
surprising, since both CBM review and inter partes review, like
reexamination, are designed to promote the same policy goals.
37 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012).
38 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(a) (2014) ("Where another
matter involving the patent is before the Office, the Board may during the pendency
of the inter partes review enter any appropriate order regarding the additional matter
including providing for the stay, transfer, consolidation, or termination of any such
matter.").
39 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1) (2012).
40 A.I.A. § 18(a)(1)(d).
41 See, e.g., AIP Acquisition LLC v. Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC, No. 1:12-cv-00617,
at *5 (D. Del. Jan. 9, 2014) (granting stay); eWatch Inc. v. Avigilon Corp., No. 1:13-
cv-0347, 2013 WL 6633936, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2013); eWatch, Inc. v. Lorex
Canada, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-03314, 2013 WL 5425298, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2013);
Comcast Cable Commc'ns, LLC v. Bear Creek Techs., Inc., MDL No. 1:12-md-02344
(GMS), 2013 WL 3789471, at *4 (D. Del. Jul. 17, 2013).
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In light of the parallel policies underlying the CBM and inter partes
review proceedings, it is not surprising that courts have applied generally
similar analysis to requests for stays in both settings. " 
42
Congress intended for the new post-grant procedures under the
AIA to reduce the burden of patent litigation on district courts by
allowing the PTAB to first resolve patentability. To ensure that
validity disputes will go forward in only one forum, if a petitioner files
a declaratory judgment action of invalidity (but not a counterclaim of
invalidity) on or after filing the PTAB petition, the statute provides
that the district court action will be automatically stayed unless: (1)
the patent owner asks the court to lift the stay, (2) the patent owner
files a civil action or counterclaim for infringement, or (3) petitioner
asks to dismiss the civil action.4 3'4 4 The statute establishes the
automatic stay where courts tend to favor granting a stay already, i.e..,
where the petition comes very early relative to the civil action devoid
of the appearance of gamesmanship. 45 But what happens when-as in
most cases--the district-court action is filed first?
If the Patent Owner files the civil action before the defendant in
an IPR or PGR proceeding, what procedures are there to ensure that
the PTAB patentability determination proceeds first? For IPRs and
PGRs (except CBMs), the AIA provides no guidance, perhaps
because District courts already have an inherent power to control
their own dockets, including the power to stay any proceeding for
good cause. Stay considerations in light of PTAB proceedings are:
(1) whether a stay will simplify issues at trial,
(2) whether discovery is complete and a trial date is set, and
(3) whether a stay will unduly prejudice the non-moving party.4 6
42 NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am., No. 2:13-cv-01058-WCB, at *10-11 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 11, 2015) (Bryson, J., sitting by designation).
41 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)-(b) (2012) (stating a counterclaim of invalidity does
not trigger the automatic stay).
44 See§ 315 (b)(2).
45 35 U.S.C. § § 315(a)(2), 325(a)(2) (2012).
46 See, e.g., Lennon Image Techs., LLC v. Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., No. 2:13-
cv-235, 2014 WL 4652117, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2014); Universal Elecs., Inc. v.
Universal Remote Control, Inc., No. SAVC 12-00329 AG (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2013)
(denying Defendant's Motion to Stay); Semiconductor Energy Lab., 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 186322, at *3-4 n.1; Star Envirotech v. Redline Detection, LLC, No. SACV
12-01861, 2013 WL 1716068, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2013) (applying reexamination
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Current research shows that to date, approximately 58% of
requests for stays across all district courts have been granted outright,
6% partially granted, 29% denied, and 7% pending.47
Motions to Stay Pending IPR
-19% Denied
91 Denied without Prejudice
Fi Granted
N Granted in Part/Denied in
Part
E9 Pending/Deferred
Figure 1: Total grant/denial rate of early IPR stay motions
(September 12, 2012 - August 15, 2015).48
While a 58% full grant rate may seem like courts do not favor
IPR stays, in fact only about 19% of motions to stay have been denied
outright (i.e., denied with prejudice). Many denials are preliminary
without prejudice, giving the moving party leave to refile once the
PTAB has decided whether to institute.49 Thus 81% of motions filed
have been successful or are still under consideration. Of note, the
figures vary by district, with motions for stay far more likely to be
granted in Delaware and Northern District of California than the
Eastern District of Texas. The Eastern District of Texas has a
inquiry to considerations of stay pending IPR); see also Gryphon Networks Corp. v.
Contact Ctr. Compliance Corp., 792 F. Supp. 2d 87, 90 (D. Mass 2011); Softview LLC
v. Apple Inc., C.A. No. 10-389-LPS, 2012 WL 3061027, at *3-5 (D. Del. July 26, 2012);
Soverain Software LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 660, 662 (E.D. Tex.
2005).
47 See Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP Research,
http://www.aiablog.com/claim-and-case-disposition/ [http://perma.cc/N9Q8-RARZ]
(based in part on statistics provided by DocketNavigator and a special thanks to Cara
Lasswell).
48 Id.
49 Id. As one example of a court denying a motion without prejudice to the
moving party's ability to renew the motion after the PTO has issued a decision on
whether to initiate IPR, see NuVasive, Inc. v. Nerovision Med. Prods., Inc., No. 15
286 LPS-CJB, 2015 WL 3918866 (D. Del. June 23, 2015).
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surprisingly high rate of "denial without prejudice" holdings, which
essentially defer the ruling on the stay motion while the trial
preparation continues.
Court Total Granted* Granted-in- Denied* Denied Pending/
Part/Denied- w/o Deferred
in-Part* Prej.
All 660 384 (58.2%) 42 (6.4%) 122 68 44 (6.7%)
(18.5%) (10.3%)
N.D. 102 60(58.8%) 14(13.7%) 11 (10.8%) 10(9.8%) 7(6.9%)
CA
E.D. 67 32 (47.8%) 3 (4.5%) 12 (17.9%) 17 3 (4.5%)
TX (25.4%)
D. Del. 72 44 (61.1%) 3 (4.2%) 15 (20.8%) 6 (8.3%) 4 (5.6%)
* Recommendations to Grant or Deny included in Totals
While these statistics provide information about general trends,
it is important to recognize their limits. For example, where a court
denies a motion to stay without prejudice, the moving party may seek
a stay at a later time, leading one case to result in multiple stay-related
orders. Consolidated cases, involving multiple defendants in parallel
suits, may be underreported where one order is entered addressing
multiple litigations. Other commentators using different statistical
methods published at different times have found other similar success
rates for stays.
50
For CBMs, Section 18 of the AIA mandates a four-factor test,
adding an additional element to the traditional stay analysis: 51
(1) whether a stay, or the denial thereof, will simplify the
issues in question and streamline the trial;
(2) whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date
has been set;
(3) whether a stay, or the denial thereof, would unduly
prejudice the nonmoving party or present a clear tactical
50 Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the
Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93-94, 103 (2014) (finding stays granted as
much as 82 of the time).
51 See Broadcast Innovation, LLC v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 2006 WL 1897165
(D. Co. July 11, 2006) (according to the legislative history, the four factors were taken
from the unpublished).
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advantage for the moving party; and
(4) whether a stay, or the denial thereof, will reduce the
burden of litigation on the parties and on the court.
52
The first three CBM factors are "largely identical" to those used
for LPRs, PGRs, and stays in other contexts.53 As Federal Circuit
Judge Bryson notes, the additional fourth factor for CBMs indicates
Congress's desire that the Courts pay special attention to minimizing
the burden of litigation involving patents relating to business and
financial methods. 54 During floor debate, Senator Schumer explained
that the provision "places a very heavy thumb on the scale in favor of
a stay, 55 when there is a CBM proceeding involved, and "it is nearly
impossible to imagine a scenario in which a district court would not
issue a stay.",
56
As this comment illustrates, Congress intended § 18 to help save
litigation costs related to CBM patents-patents the provision's
sponsors identified as problematic.57 While the statute does not
mandate stays, Congress sought a means for Courts to stay CBM
litigations more often than they normally would, to simplify matters
and save unnecessary litigation costs.
58
The success rates for motions to stay pending CBMs are similar
to those for IPRs, keeping in mind the smaller sample size.
52 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(b)(1), 125 Stat.
284, 331 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
53 See NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am., Case No. 2:13-cv-01058-WCB, at 3 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 11, 2015) (Bryson, J., sitting by designation).
54 See NFC Tech., No. 2:13-cv-01058-WCB, at 4 (Bryson, J., sitting by
desgnation).
157 CONG. REC. S1,363-65 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
56 Id.
57 See id.
58 See Market-Alerts Pty. Ltd. v. Bloomberg Fin. L.P., 922 F. Supp. 2d 486, 490
(D. Del. 2013) (quoting 157 CONG. REC. S1053 ("Since the entire purpose of the
transitional [CBM] program at the PTO is to reduce the burden of litigation, it is
nearly impossible to imagine a scenario in which a district court would not issue a
stay."); SightSound Techs. LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 2:11-cv-01292, 2013 WL 2457284,
Order at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 6, 2013) (same); Versata Software, Inc. v. Volusion, Inc.,
No. 1:12-cv-00893, at *3 (W.D. Tex. June 20, 2013) (noting Congress intended that "a
stay [pending CBM review] should only be denied in extremely rare instances.");
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., No. 1:10-cv-01370, 2013 WL
1662952, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2013) (quoting 157 Cong. Rec. S1363-64 as stating
that the fourth statutory stay factor for CBMs provides a "heavy thumb" on the scale,
favoring a stay); Zillow, Inc. v. Trulia, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-01549, 2013 WL 5530573, at *3
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 2013) (same).
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Court Total Granted Granted-in- Denied Denied Pending/
Part/Denied- w/o Deferred
in-Part Prej.
All 139 80 (57.6%) 10 (7.2%) 24 (17.3%) 19 6 (4.3%)
(13.7%)
N.D. 8 5 (62.5%) 1(12.5%) 1 (12.5%) 1(12.5%) 0 (0%)
CA I
E.D. 37 14 (37.8%) 1 (2.7%) 8 (21.6%) 11 3 (8.1%)
TX (29.7%)
D. Del. 16 11 (68.8%) 2 (12.5%) 2 (12.5%) 1 (6.25%) 0 (0%)
AIA § 18 also provides for interlocutory appeal of stay decisions
to the Federal Circuit, which may review the district court's reasoning
de novo.59 According to Senator Charles Schumer, de novo review
was "central to the purpose of the interlocutory appeal provision,"
which he characterized as ensuring the "consistent application of
standards and precedents across the country and to avoid one
particular court with a favorable bench becoming the preferred venue
of business method patent plaintiffs., 60 As of the time this article was
written, the Federal Circuit has issued opinions on five interlocutory
appeals, shedding some preliminary light on the manner in which that
court will approach the question of whether to stay district court
litigation in view of pending CBM review. In all but one instance, the
final determination would have resulted in a stay.
District courts considering stays pending IPR review have also
relied on, and been somewhat influenced by, these Federal Circuit
cases. In short, the likelihood of success in obtaining a stay will
substantively depend on the following four factors.
A. Factor 1. Simplification of the Issues
On one hand, PTAB consideration of the patentability of any
asserted patent claim could simplify the issues before the district
court, meaning that the first factor might always weigh in favor of
granting a stay. After all, if the Board holds all of the claims
unpatentable, the district court may dismiss the suit. If the Board
59 157 CONG. REC., supra note 61, at S1,364 (quoting Sen. Schumer: "[ilt is
expected that the Federal Circuit will review the district court's decision regarding a
stay de novo, unless there are unique circumstances militating against a de novo
review, such as subsequent requests for an interlocutory appeal in the same case").
60 Id.
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holds only some of the claims are unpatentable, there will be fewer
left for the district court to consider. And even if the Board cancels no
claims, the court case will be simplified because estoppel will limit the
arguments available, and the PTAB will have construed claims, which
may encourage the parties to settle or at least aid the district court's
decision-making.61 Stay is particularly justified when "the outcome of
a PTO proceeding is likely to assist the court in determining patent
validity or eliminate the need to try infringement issues." 62 The actual
treatment of this factor, however, is more nuanced.
Key factors include whether the PTAB proceeding has been
instituted (versus a petition just being filed) and the amount of
overlap between the claims asserted in the litigation and the ones of
which review is sought. In the best case (weighing most heavily in
favor of stay), the PTAB has instituted, and therefore will review, all
of the asserted claims in the litigation. 63 Where the PTAB has already
instituted review of claims at issue in the district court, there is a
"substantial likelihood of simplification of the district court litigation,"
but "that likelihood is far more speculative before the PTAB decides
whether to institute., 64  In VirtualAgility, for example, this factor
61 Neste Oil OYJ v. Dynamic Fuels, LLC, C.A. No. 12-1744-GMS, 2013 WL
3353984, at *4 (D. Del. July 2, 2013) (quoting Gioello Enters. Ltd. v. Mattel, Inc., No.
C.A. 99-375 GMS, 2001 WL 125340, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 29, 2001)).
62 Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC v. Millennial Media, Inc., No. 5:13-cv-4206,
2014 WL 2738501, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2014); see also, 3rd Eye Surveillance,
LLC v. Stealth Monitoring, Inc., No. 6:14-cv-162, 2015 WL 179000, at *1 (E.D. Tex.
Jan. 14, 2015); Norman IP Holdings, LLC v. TP-Link Techs. Co., No. 6:13-cv-384,
2014 WL 5035718, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2014); Air Vent, Inc. v. Owens Corning
Corp., No. 2:10-cv-1699, 2012 WL 1607145, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 8, 2012); Gould v.
Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d 1340,1342 (Fed. Cir.1983).
63 See, e.g., Unifi Scientific Batteries, LLC v. Sony Mobile Commc'ns AB, No.
6:12-cv-224, 2014 WL 4494479, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2014) (denying review where
a large number of the claims at issue were not in inter partes review).See NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC America, Inc., Case No. 2:13-cv-01058-WCB, 2015
WL 1069111, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015) (collecting cases) (citing at *7: the "near-
uniform line of authority" as reflecting "that after the PTAB has instituted review
proceedings, the parallel district court litigation ordinarily should be stayed."); (citing
IPR-related stays at *6: Capella Photonics, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-03348,
2015 WL 1006582 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015); Gentherm Can., Ltd. v. IGB Auto., Ltd.,
No. 1:13-cv-11536, 2015 WL 804657 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2015); Verinata Health, Inc.
v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-cv-5501, 2015 WL 435457 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2015);
Service Solutions U.S., L.L.C. v. Autel.US Inc., No. 1:13-cv-10534, 2015 WL 401009
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 28, 2015); In re CTP Innovations, LLC, Patent Litig., MDL 1:14-md-
2581, 2015 WL 317149 (D. Md. Jan. 23, 2015); Safe Storage LLC v. Dell Inc., No. 1:12-
cv-01624 (D. Del. Jan. 22, 2015); utsforth, Inc. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Techs.
Corp., No. 12-1200, 2015 BL 69740 (D. Minn. Jan. 15, 2015); CANVS Corp. v. United
States, No. 1:10-cv-00540, 2014 BL, at *10 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 19, 2014); Kaneka Corp. v.
SKC Kolon P1, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-3397, 2014 BL 378445 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014);
Locata LBS LLC v. Paypal Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01864, 2014 BL 378444 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4,
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heavily favored a stay because the PTAB "expressly determined that
all of the claims are more likely than not unpatentable" when it
instituted CBM review. The Federal Circuit held that "[t]he district
court erred as a matter of law to the extent that it decided to 'review'
the PTAB's determination that the claims of the [] patent are more
likely than not invalid in the posture of a ruling on a motion to stay"
65
an "improper collateral attack on the PTAB's decision to institute
CBM review.
66
Some courts have granted motions to stay even before the PTAB
had decided whether to institute.67  There, the district court gave
weight to the fact that a high percentage of petitions being filed were
being instituted, and therefore, while not certain, there was a high
likelihood that the PTO would review the claims.68 Courts have also
2014); Surfcast, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:12-cv-00333, 2014 WL 6388489 (D. Me.
Nov. 14, 2014); Norman IP Holdings, LLC v. Chrysler Group LLC, No. 6:13-cv-00278,
2014 BL, at *32 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2014); Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. GSI Tech.,
Inc., No. 1:13-cv-02013, 2014 WL 5021100 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2014); Intellectual
Ventures II LLC v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-02454, 2014 WL 5019911 (N.D.
Ga. Oct. 7, 2014); Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 1:13-cv-
04513, 2014 WL 4802426 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2014); PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v.
Google Inc., No. 5:13-cv-01317, 2014 WL 4100743 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2014);
Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. U.S. Bancorp, Civil No. 1:13-cv-02071, 2014 WL
5369386 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2014); Affinity Labs of Texas LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
No. 1:14-cv-02717, 2014 WL 3845684 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2014); Depomed Inc. v.
Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1:13-cv-00571, 2014 WL 3729349 (D.N.J. July 25, 2014)); See
also, CBM-related stays: Moneycat Ltd. v. Paypal Inc., No. 1:14-cv-02490, 2014 WL
5689844 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2014); Secure Axcess, LLC v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No.
6:13-cv-00717, 2014 BL, at *40 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2014); DataTreasury Corp. v.
Fiserv, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00431, 2014 BL, at *212 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2014); Solutran,
Inc. v. Elavon, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-02637, 2014 BL, at *7 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2014); Segin
Sys., Inc. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., No. 2:13-cv-00190, 2014 WL 3895931 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 8, 2014); Versata Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software, Inc., 780 F.3d 1134 (Fed.
Cir. 2015). (discussing appeals from CBM-related stays); Benefit Funding Sys. LLC v.
Adv. Am. Cash Adv. Ctrs. Inc., 767 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
65 In VirtualAgility, the district court analyzed the likelihood of success at the
PTAB. Noting that prior patent examination was "thorough[,]" it considered
numerous prior art references and section 101 issues; the PTAB instituted review
based on only one reference. Other non-prior art references "of particular
importance" were involved in litigation, but not before PTAB. The Federal Circuit
rejected this approach, finding that the court below had improperly adjudged the
merits of the grounds before the PTAB.
VirtualAgility, Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
67 MLC Intell. Prop., LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., No. 14-cv-03657, 2015 WL
496407 (N.D.C.A. Feb. 3, 2015); Four Mile Bay LLC. v. Jem Zimmer Holdings, No.
3:14-CV-1300-JVB-JEM, 2015 WL 4641609 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 3, 2015); iMTX
Strategic LLC v. Vimeo LLC, No. C 15-00592 JSW, 2015 WL 4089911 (N.D. Cal. July
6, 2015).
68 See., e.g., America Invents Act, www.aiablog.com [http://perma.cc/458V-3J9X]
(collecting statistics).
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considered that the PTO generally makes a decision whether to
institute within six months of the filing of the petition, meaning that,
even if the PTO denies the petition, the length of the stay will be
relatively short.69 Recently, however, more courts have been willing
to call motions to stay premature unless the PTAB proceeding has
been instituted, especially the Eastern District of Texas, where Judge
Bryson, sitting by designation, held that the "likelihood [of
simplification of the issues] is far more speculative before the PTAB




Showing that PTAB proceedings will simplify the case is harder
where the district court case involves multiple asserted patents,
multiple defendants, or multiple causes of action. IPRs and CBMs are
assessed patent-by-patent. As such, accused infringers seeking to shift
a multi-patent dispute entirely to the PTO must file multiple petitions
for PTAB review, at least one of each aimed at one of the asserted
patents.
Courts may still grant a stay where only some of the asserted
claims are undergoing review, as this could still narrow the issues for
the Court.7' In Robert Bosch Healthcare System, Inc. v. Cardiocom,
LLC,72 for example, the Northern District of California granted a stay
where the most, but not all, of the asserted claims were subject to
PTAB review, reasoning that "[h]ere, it seems more likely than not
that at least some of the claims may be at least amended during
reexamination. In that case, the court would greatly benefit from the
PTO's guidance as to the scope of the claims., 73 And in Versata
Software v. Callidus Software, the Federal Circuit-albeit in an
opinion vacated due to an eleventh-hour settlement-recognized that
"[s]tays can be warranted even when a CBM proceeding does not
69 Id.
70 See NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-01058-WCB, 2015 WL
1069111, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015); see also Cobalt Boats v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc.,
No. 2:15cv21, 2015 WL 2454296 (E.D. Va. May 21, 2015).
71 See Bonutti Skeletal Innovations, L.L.C. v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., No. 12-cv-
01107, 2014 WL 1369721 (D. Del. Apr. 7, 2014) (granting stay where four of six
patents were instituted in IPR and showing that the same is true if there are IPRs
filed against some patents, but not all of those asserted in the litigation).
72 No. 12-3864-EJD, 2012 WL 6020012 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 3, 2012).
73 Id. at *2; see also Princeton Digital Image Corp. v. Konami Digital Entm't Inc.,
No. 12-1461-LPS-CJB & No. 13-335-LPS-CJB, 2014 WL 3819458 (D. Del. Jan. 15,
2014) (granting stay even though one IPR has not yet been instituted and, subsequent
history, Princeton Digital Image Corp. v. Konami Digital Entm 't Inc., No. 1:12-1461-
LPS-CJB & No. 13-335-LPS-CJB, 2014 WL 3819458 (D. Del. Jan. 14, 2015)
(continuing stay after institution was denied for three dependent claims, thus the
validity of some claims would not be resolved by the PTAB).
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address all asserted patents, claims, or invalidity defenses."7 4 Other
courts, however, have reached the opposite conclusion where the
PTAB is taking a second look at only select claims.75 In the Eastern
District of Texas, for instance, a judge found that since many asserted
claims were not under review, this weighed against a stay.76
The timing of the party's motion to stay also influences the
analysis of the first factor. As a divided Federal Circuit panel
explained in Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., "the focus of this factor is
on streamlining or obviating the trial by providing the district court
with the benefit of the PTO's consideration of the validity of the
patents before either the court or the jury is tasked with undertaking
that same analysis., 77 Thus, courts may be reluctant to grant a stay in
favor of a CBM where, as in Smartflash, trial has already occurred in
78
whole or in part. Indeed, in Smartflash, the Federal Circuit upheld
the denial of a stay requested after trial, but overruled the denial of a
stay sought just before trial began.79
In cases with multiple co-defendants, courts have frequently
conditioned stays on the willingness of co-defendants to agree not to
assert any invalidity contention actually raised and finally adjudicated
in the PTAB proceedings. 80 This type of agreement extends the
74 771 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed Cir. 2014), vacated as moot, No. 2014-1468 (Fed. Cir.
Feb. 27, 2015) (slip op.).
75 See, e.g., Card-Monroe Corp. v. Tuftco Corp., Case No. 1:14-cv-292, 2015 BL,
at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2015) ("the benefit of such a review would be limited
because it would only have the potential to resolve issues with one of the three
patents at issue in the instant litigation.").
76 Unifi Sci. Batteries, LLC v. Sony Mobile Commc'ns AB, No. 6:12-cv-224, 2014
WL 4494479 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2014) (denying review where a large number of the
claims at issue were not in inter partes review).
77 2015 WL 4603820,-Fed. Appx. -, at *4 (July 30, 2015) (non-precedential).
78 Per statute, CBMs may be filed at any time, but an IPR can be filed only within
one year of the service of a district-court complaint. As such, a trial occurring before a
stay is requested-as in Smartflash-is much more likely in relation to a CBM than an
IPR. The Smartflash majority confirmed district court findings that, in seeking a stay
after trial, the moving party demonstrated a lack of diligence in filing, as well as an
attempt to gain tactical advantage over the patent owner. 2015 WL 4603820 at *6-*7.
79 Id. But see Ultratec, Inc. v. Sorenson Comm. Inc., No. 13-cv-346-bbc, 2015 WL
2248437 (granting stay in view of IPR after receipt of jury verdict, but before ruling
on ost-trial motions)(W.D. Wis. May 13, 2015).
See, e.g., Capella Photonics, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27953,
*10-11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015) (finding co-defendants' agreement to be bound by the
IPR estoppel provisions alleviated Court's concerns and weighed in favor of a stay);
iMTX Strategic LLC v. Vimeo LLC,No. C 15-00592 JSW, 2015 WL 4089911 (N.D.
Cal. July 6, 2015)(granting stay conditioned on agreement to be estopped from
asserting any invalidity contention that was actually raised and finally adjudicated in
the CBM proceedings); Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Chimei Innolux Corp., No.
12-21-JST, 2012 WL 7170593, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) (granting stay because
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estoppel provisions governing IPR and CBM proceedings to all co-
defendants-regardless of whether they are involved in the PTAB
proceeding. Failing to have all of the co-defendants' agree may weigh
against a stay.8 1 Likewise, party procedural stipulations may lessen
perceived prejudice to the patent owner-parties seeking a stay
should also consider stipulating to any of the following: jointly
dissolving a stay at the end of IPR, PGR, or CBM if asserted claims
survive, procedural concessions or an accelerated trial schedule should
the claims survive, or meet-and-confer requirements, among others.
82
IPR proceedings are limited to only anticipation or obviousness
over prior art patents or printed publications (under §§ 102 and 103 of
the Patent Act), leaving other invalidity arguments for court. Some
courts have refused stays in cases with other causes of action or
invalidity theories, especially where the party seeking the stay injected
the additional issues via counterclaims. 3 Future courts may also
"Defendants who did not file the IPR petitions have agreed to be bound by the
estoppel provisions of the IPR proceedings"); Pi-Net Int'l, Inc v. Focus Bus. Bank,
No. 5-12-cv-04958, ECF No. 58, 2013 WL 4475940 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2013); Achates
Reference Publ'g., Inc. v. Symantec Corp., No. 2-11-cv-00294, BL at *60 (E.D. Tex.
April 17, 2013); see also Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 5-
13-cv-04513, 2014 WL 819277, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014) (conditionally granting
a non-petitioner defendant's motion to stay pending inter partes review contingent
upon defendants' agreement to be subject to 'weaker' statutory estoppel due to the
defendant's non-involvement with the IPR proceedings, stating "[B]ecause
[defendant] is not one of the IPR petitioners, [it] would not be precluded under 35
U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) from reasserting invalidity contentions rejected by the PTO .... If
[defendant] and IPR petitioners communicate on strategy, [defendant] should be
bound by the full statutory estoppel provision. If, however, [defendant] has no input
on the IPR strategy, it should not be precluded from raising arguments that could
have been raised in the IPR proceedings."); In re. Protegrity Corp., No. MDL No.
2600, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27953, *10-11WL 4734938 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, Aug. 10,
2015) (finding co-defendants' discussing N.D. California cases requiring agreement to
be bound by the IPR estopped, but allowing stay without estoppel provisions
alleviated Court's concerns and weighed in favor of a stay). 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2).
81 See Semiconductor Energy Lab v. Chimei Innolux Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 186322, at *6-7 ("The estoppel effect of inter partes review carries less weight
when there are several defendants that are not parties to, and thus are not bound by,
the estoppel effects of the proceeding."); also e-Watch Inc. v. Avigilon Corp., No. H-
13-0347, 2013 WL 6633936, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2013) (granting stay pending
related litigation IPR proceedings with Mobitix, but awaiting determination as to
whether Avigilon should be estopped under § 315 of the AIA from asserting any §
102/103 arguments that reasonably could have been raised by Mobitix, or only
estojped on the grounds actually raised in the related IPR by Mobitix).
See Order Granting Joint Motion To Stay Litigation Pending Covered
Business Method Patent Review, Blue Calypso, Inc. v. Groupon, Inc., No. 6:12-CV-
00486 (E.D. Tex. July 19, 2013) (granting a stay in a trial with many defendants, given
nine listed stipulations all parties agreed to).
83 U.S. Nutraceuticals LLC v. Cyanotech Corp., No. 5:12-cv-00366, at 5-6 (M.D.
Fla. Oct. 15, 2013) ("The inter partes review proceeding will have no bearing on
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hesitate to stay where patent infringement represents only a portion
of a case. Issues of trade secret misappropriation, unfair competition,
or trademark infringement, for example, may expand a case beyond
patentability.
B. Factor II: State of District Court Proceedings
The second factor courts weigh in ruling on motions to stay-
whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been set-
allows courts to consider both the time and energy already expended
and whether it would be cheaper to stay the case while the PTAB
considers patentability. The answer will depend on many factors, but
two more than others: 1) in which district court is the litigation
pending; and 2) at what point in the proceedings did the petitioner file
the petition. It is no surprise, and often the subject of conversation,
that the scheduling and management of patent cases differs greatly
across districts. Some "rocket docket" courts quickly push cases to
trial in two years or less. Others are more measured, allowing parties
years to develop their positions through protracted discovery, claim
construction, and pre-trial matters. These differences-and the
petitioners' timing of filing also color the way jurisdictions approach
requests to stay pending patent litigation in view of PTAB
proceedings.
Even though timing differs by district, courts tend to find
requests to stay reasonable when the petition is filed before any
serious activity in the litigation. Judge Bryson, sitting in the Eastern
District of Texas by designation, found filing IPR petitions seven and
one-half months after the complaint (and therefore four months after
the service of infringement contentions) was reasonable, where "[t]he
motion to stay was filed very promptly after the PTAB instituted inter
partes review."84 So motions filed within months may favor grant.85
Courts are less likely to find that the litigation will be simplified
Defendants' counterclaims, such as for unfair competition."); See also Versata
Software Inc. v. Callidus Software Inc., 771 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated
as moot, No. 2014-1468 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 27, 2015).
84 Memorandum Op. and Order at 7, NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am., No. 2:13-CV-
01058-WCB (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015) (Bryson, J., sitting by designation).
85 See, e.g., Destination Maternity Corp. v. Target Corp., 12 F. Supp. 3d 762, 766-
68 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (less than four months after infringement contentions is reasonably
timely); Software Rights Archive, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 12-3970 RMW, 2013
WL 5225522, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2013) (just over four months after
identification of asserted claims was reasonable); Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v.
Chimei Innolux Corp., No. SACV 12-21-JST (JPRx), 2012 WL 7170593, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) (finding 3-4 month delay in filing petition after infringement
contentions reasonable).
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or resources saved by PTAB proceedings if the Markman and
discovery process is complete.8 6 Where the parties have already filed
Markman briefs on the meaning of the claims, exchanged documents,
or deposed witnesses, courts may find that little remains to be done
before trial and deny a stay. And in districts with relatively faster
times to trial-such as the Eastern District of Texas or the Eastern
District of Virginia-stays pending PTAB proceedings may be less
likely simply because cases are often closer to trial in these
jurisdictions before they consider the stay request.8 7
And although a party may seek an IPR at any point within a year
of receiving a complaint, requesting review earlier may mean a chance
for the Board to institute the IPR, thus making a stay more likely-or
allowing for time to renew the stay motion if the PTAB institutes. For
example, a Middle District of Florida judge initially denied a motion
to stay-with leave to refile after a PTAB decision on institution-in
Automatic Manufacturing Systems v. Primera Technologies.88  The
judge noted that the six-month "limbo" between filing of the petition
and institution meant that, if the USPTO chose not to proceed, "this
action will have been left languishing on the Court's docket with no
discovery, no positioning of the parties on claim construction, and no
dispositive motions." 89 But the same judge later granted the renewed
motion to stay-once the Board instituted the IPR-finding the
matter "now ripe for adjudication." 90 By seeking PTAB review soon
after a case begins, the party challenging the patent increases it odds
of staying the litigation.
In VirtualAgility, the overturned district court judge found that
86 Bonutti Research Inc. v. Lantz Medical, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00609-SEB-MJD,
2015 WL 3386601, at *2 (S.D. Ind. May 26, 2015)(denying motion to stay where
parties had submitted Markman briefs, Markman hearing was set, and depositions
had begun); Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Universal Remote Control, Inc., at 4, No. SACV
12-00329 AG, ECF No. 78 at 5 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2013) (order denying defendant's
motion to stay pending IPR where plaintiff had already served written discovery, trial
date was set, and the court had held Markman hearing and issued claim construction
ruling); see also Unwired Planet, LLC v. Square, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-00579-RCJ, 2014
WL 4966033 (D.Nev. Oct.3, 2014) (denying motion to stay where majority of
discovery was complete and a Markman order was imminent).
87 SynQor, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 2-14-cv-00286 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2015)
(denying motion to stay when fact and expert discovery had closed and case was
headed for trial in three months).
88 No. 6:12-cv-1727-Orl-37DAB, 2013 WL 1969247, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 13,
2013) (denying stay with leave to refile).
89 Id. at *3 ("Put simply, the parties will be no closer to trial in a type of case that
requires 'early substantive disclosure' in order to efficiently manage discovery and
pretrial motion practice.").
90 2013 WL 6133763, at *1, *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2013) (granting stay).
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the "relatively early stage of the proceedings" important; that the
parties had completed some discovery, six months of fact discovery
remained, and claim construction activities had occurred counseled
"in favor" of granting a stay.91  On appeal, the Federal Circuit
generally agreed, holding "it was not error for the district court to wait
until the PTAB made its decision to institute CBM review before it
ruled on the motion.,
92
By filing early during litigation, defendants increase the chance
that the PTAB has already instituted, which further increases the
probability a court will grant a stay. In VirtualAgility, for example, the
Court said there is "no doubt the case for a stay is stronger after post-
grant review has been instituted., 93  Occasionally, courts delayed
considering stay motions until the PTAB spoke first, avoiding
delaying the litigation when it was still uncertain if the Board would
grant review.94 By filing relatively early in litigation, defendants
remove the doubt.
C. Factor III: Undue Prejudice
For the third prong, courts weigh the impact that granting a stay
will have on the parties. Many have argued a stay will necessarily
advantage the moving party, disadvantaging the patent owner. But the
omnipresent potential for delay does not alone suffice to establish the
prejudice needed to deny a stay.95 PTO proceedings like inter partes
91 See VirtualAgility, Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00011-JRG, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2286, at *17 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2014).
92 See VirtualAgility, Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
93 Id. at 1316.
94 See, e.g., Order Regarding Motion For Immediate Stay at 5-6, MiMedX
Group, Inc. v. Tissue Transplant Tech., No. SA-14-CA-719 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2015)
("While IPR proceedings could simplify the issues in this case if granted, the Court is
unable to determine the likelihood of that event at this stage of the litigation").
Contra Order at 5, Airwatch LLC v. Good Tech. Corp., No. 1:14-cv-02281-SCJ (N.D.
Ga. Feb. 13, 2015) (finding that even a denial of an IPR would "be instructive" and
wei§h in favor of simplification of the issues).
Conair Corp. v. Tre Milano, LLC, No. 3:14-cv-1554(AWT), 2015 WL 4041724,
at *4 (D. Conn. July 1, 2015) (citing Smart Modular Technologies, Inc. v. Netlist, Inc.,
No. 2:12-CV-02319-TLN, 2013 WL 2384342, at *5 (E.D.Cal. May 30, 2013) for
proposition that "[d]elay by itself does not necessarily constitute undue prejudice, as
nearly every judicial stay involves delay."); Neste Oil Oyj v. Dynamic Fuels, LLC, No.
12-662-GMS, 2013 WL 424754, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 31, 2013) (finding that "the
potential for delay does not, by itself, establish undue prejudice" and that concerns
about direct competitiveness were not persuasive in that case); Capriola Corp. v.
LaRose Indus., LLC, No. 8:12-cv-2346-SDM-TBM (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2013) ECF
No. 49 (staying litigation notwithstanding that the parties directly competed in the
market).
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reexamination could last for years. Today, the PTAB must complete
IPRs and CBMs twelve months after instituting, without the delay of
an internal PTO appellate review. Courts have found that this
statutorily mandated timeline mitigates risks of effervescent evidence
or ephemeral circumstances that might have counseled against a stay
before the passage of the AIA. Note that "waiting for the
administrative process to run its course" often "risks prolonging the
final resolution of the dispute and thus may result in some inherent
prejudice to the plaintiff. 96 While this potential for delay "by itself"
does not tend to establish undue prejudice, it could be an additional
consideration. 97 Further, a second stay may be less likely to succeed.98
Close cases that would have been denied in light of reexamination,
however, may now favor the movant-"for granting inter partes
review probably results in an even higher likelihood than under the
prior standard that the issues in this action will be simplified by the
reexamination. 99
There are other factors courts consider when deciding the
"undue prejudice"/"clear tactical advantage" prong.100 For example,
courts often begin their undue prejudice inquiry by determining if the
litigants directly compete in the market.101  If the parties sell
96 See Market-Alerts, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 494.
97 Neste Oil Oyj v. Dynamic Fuels, LLC, No. 12-662-GMS, 2013 WL 424754, at
*2, *3 (D. Del. Jan.31, 2013) (finding that "the potential for delay does not, by itself,
establish undue prejudice" and that concerns about direct competitiveness were not
persuasive in that case); Order at 2-5, Capriola Corp. v. LaRose Indus., LLC, No.
8:12-cv-2346-SDM-23TBM (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2013) (staying litigation
notwithstanding that the parties directly competed in the market).
98 Order at 1-2, NUTech Ventures v. Norman, No. 1:12-cv-2326 (N.D. Ohio July
30, 2013) (denying a second stay request during PTO rehearing proceedings, after
granting an earlier stay).
9 Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. Ltd. v. Chimei Innolux Corp., No. SACV 12-
21-JST (JPRx), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186322, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Inogen, Inc. v.
Inova Labs, Inc., No. SACV 11-1692-JST (ANx), 2012 WL 4748803, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 20, 2012).
100 Voltstar Techs., Inc. v. Superior Commc'ns, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00082-JRG, 2013
WL 4511290, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2013); E-Watch, Inc. v. Lorex Canada, Inc.,
No. H-12-3314, 2013 WL 5425298, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2013); Semiconductor
Energy Lab. Co. v. Chimei Innolux Corp., No. SACV 12-21-JST (JPRx), 2012 WL
7170593, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012); TierraVision, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No.
11CV2170 DMS(BGS), 2012 WL 559993, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012).
101 Four Mile Bay LLC. v. Jem Zimmer Holdings, No. 3:14-CV-1300-JVB-JEM,
2015 WL 4641609 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 3, 2015)(noting that parties were not direct
competitors when concluding that no undue prejudice existed); Allure Energy Inc. v.
Honeywell Intern., Inc., 2015 WL 4207243 (W.D. Tex. July 2, 2015) (denying stay
where "the parties are direct competitors in [a] narrow, still-emerging market" and
patent holder, a small start-up company, contended that it could go out of business if
stay was instituted); Davol v. Atrium Med. Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00958-GMS, 2013 U.S.
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competing products and a stay could cause the patent owner to lose
market share to the accused infringer, courts are less willing to make
the patent owner wait for the PTAB proceeding to conclude.10 2
Conversely, where the patent owner does not practice the patent, does
not directly compete with the accused infringer, or if the patent has
expired, damages may sufficiently compensate the patent owner if its
claims survive the PTAB.
In VirtualAgility, for example, the district court had noted
"credible evidence" that the parties were direct competitors, and that
the patentee, a "small company with private investors and limited
resources," risked potential loss of market share and consumer
goodwill if the litigation were stayed. The court also highlighted the
potential risk of losing witnesses and memory, given time. a0 3 Judge
Gilstrap thus found the third factor came out "heavily against"
granting a stay.104 The Federal Circuit disagreed.0 5  While
"competition between parties can weigh in favor of finding undue
prejudice," the Federal Circuit found there was little direct evidence
that these two companies competed, there was no irreparable harm
where a stay would "not diminish the monetary damages" to which
VirtualAgility would be entitled to should it eventually prevail.
10 6
The panel also found it relevant that VirtualAgility did not
move to preliminarily enjoin Salesforce.com, given VirtalAgility's
argument that it needed quick injunctive relief to avoid prejudice.'0
7
They also found that assertions that potentially relevant witnesses
were elderly-over 60 and over 70-did not, without evidence that
they were in ill health, result in undue prejudice, adding: "Since when
Dist. LEXIS 84533, at *19 (D. Del, June 17, 2013) (denying stay and finding that
"Davol will suffer undue prejudice should it be forced to continue competing with
Atrium's accused products without being permitted to advance its infringement
claims."); Avago Techs. Fiber Ltd. v. IPtronics Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82665, at
*17 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2011) ("Staying a case while [harm in the marketplace] is
ongoing usually prejudices the patentee that seeks timely enforcement of its right to
exclude."); Heraeus Electro-Nite Co. LLC v. Vesuvius USA Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1887, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2010) ("[C]ourts have been reluctant to grant
stays where, as here, the parties are direct competitors."). Courts have even
considered lost market share and revenue an "irreparable injury" that weighs heavily
against a stay that would delay the outcome of infringement proceedings.
102 See supra note 95.
103 See VirtualAgility, Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00011-JRG, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2286, at *23-24 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2014).
104 See id.
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did 60 become so old?
10 8
A stay prejudices the patentee less, if at all, where the patent
has already expired.10 9 Then, litigation delays will not affect the
patent's term, which will have already run.110 Damages are fixed
based on the filing date of the litigation and the expiration of the
patent, lessening prejudice.11" ' In such circumstances, courts are less
likely to find undue prejudice due to the passage of time.
D. Factor IV (CBM only): Reduction of litigation burden on the
parties and the court.
The AIA § 18 requires courts to consider a fourth factor when
considering a stay in favor of CBM proceedings. By expressly
requiring consideration of whether the stay, or the denial thereof, will
reduce the burden of litigation on the parties and the court, one
member of Congress suggested that it "places a very heavy thumb on
the scale in favor of [a] stay. '  Decisions to date have proven the
prediction true.
In the overturned VirtualAgility district court decision, for
example, Judge Gilstrap found it unlikely that the PTAB would cancel
even a "substantial number" of asserted claims. He found that there
were prior art references before court that were not before PTAB,
needing separate resolution, and found that "general relief from dual
track litigation . . . is inherent to all CBM reviews . . ." not crediting
it.1 3 Thus, he found the fourth factor to be "slightly in favor" of a
stay.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit clarified that this factor shouldn't
be collapsed into other factors, even given that chance for
redundancies. 1 4 Considerations included "the number of plaintiffs
and defendants, the parties' and witnesses' places of residence, issues
of convenience, the court's docket and in particular its potential
familiarity with the patents at issue."'1 5 They disagreed with the lower
court and reversed.
1o8 See id. at 1319.
109 See, e.g., Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Stay Pending Inter Parties
Review at 2, Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Universal Remote Control, Inc, No. SAVC 12-
00329 AG (JPRx) (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2013), ECF No. 78.110 See id.
ill Id. at 10 ("for the two asserted patents that have already expired, there can be
no further lost-customer type harm.").
112 157 CONG. REC. S1363-65(daily ed.Mar.8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
113 VirtualAgility, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2286, at *23-24 & n.4.
114 See VirtualAgility, 759 F.3d at 1324.
115 Id. at 1315 n. 4.
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In Market-Alerts Party Ltd. v. Bloomberg Financial, Judge
Pearson found that the plaintiff did not properly argue the fourth cost-
of-litigation factor; further, granting a "stay would relieve Liberty
Mutual and Progressive of the burden of litigating in multiple fora.'
1 6
Still further, the "Court would be relieved of having to expend
substantial judicial resources in deciding claim construction,
noninfringement, and invalidity issues before those claims are




While costs and complexity of individual cases will vary, and
cases may involve multiple challenges, patents, assertions, or other
complicating factors, courts can compare the cost of an average post-
grant proceeding with those of an average litigation, to conclude that
in general avoidance of litigation will be cost-effective. A 2015
economic survey by the American Intellectual Property Law
Association (AIPLA), for example, identifies the median costs of
post-grant work to be $275,000 through the PTAB hearing and
$350,000 through appeal, as compared to the cost of litigation, which
can quickly cost multiple millions of dollars." 8 Those seeking a stay
may find that such cost data may be useful in demonstrating that the
fourth cost-of-litigation factor weighs in favor of a stay, especially if
the stay is requested before substantial costs are expended in the
litigation. Even if substantial costs have already been incurred
because, for example, the Markman hearing has already taken place
or discovery has been completed, this factor may weigh in favor of a
stay if the heavy cost of trial can be avoided.
IV. FEDERAL CIRCUIT APPEALS OF STAY MOTIONS.
The AIA specifically provides for interlocutory appeal of
decisions on motions for stay pending completion of a CBM
proceeding and the Federal Circuit may consider such appeals de
novo. In contrast, decisions on motion for stay pending IPR are
reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard, a higher burden for
the appellant. Because appeals from IPR-related stay decisions are
not interlocutory," 9 IPR stays are both less likely to be appealed and
16 See Market-Alerts Pty. Ltd. v. Bloomberg Fin. L.P., 922 F. Supp. 2d 486 (D.
Del. Feb. 5, 2013).
117 See id.
118 Id. See also 2015 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY, AMERICAN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION 32.
119 See Ultratec, Inc. v. Captioncall, LLC, No. 2015-1694,-Fed. Appx -, 2105
WL 4528272, at *1. (Fed. Cir. June 30, 2015); see also Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.
Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 277-78 (1988) (stay denials are subject to
reconsideration and not final, and thus are not appealable).
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more likely to take longer to reach appeal. Not surprisingly, five of six
post-AIA appeals of decisions on stay motions to date are related to
CBM.
As of August 2015, the Federal Circuit had considered five
decisions on parties' requests to stay litigation for CBM reviews and
one case seeking mandamus review of a stay in favor of an IPR. In all
but one, the Federal Circuit ruled in favor of a stay, confirming (at
least so far) that stays are indeed favored where the PTAB is
reviewing a litigated patent. The outlier-the non-precedential
Smartflash v. Apple-involved a party seeking to stay a case after a
jury trial on a CBM filed late in the proceeding.
In VirtualAgility, Inc. v. SalesForce.com, Inc.,2 ° the Federal
Circuit reversed the Eastern District of Texas's denial of a stay
pending CBM, analyzed the four factors anew, and concluded that
they favored a stay. They found that the district court's review of the
PTAB's decision to institute clearly erred, as it was essentially a
collateral attack on the Board's institution decision. 121
In Benefit Funding Systems v. Advance America Cash Advance
Centers Inc.,122 the Federal Circuit affirmed the District of Delaware's
grant of a stay. In doing so, the Federal Circuit noted that "[t]he stay
determination is not the time or the place to review the PTAB's
decisions to institute a CBM proceeding.' 23 The Federal Circuit
found that because "CBM review was instituted and that such review
addresses whether the claims are directed to patentable subject
matter," the CBM would necessarily narrow the issues before the
district court. In view of the lack of evidence regarding the other
factors set forth in Section 18, the panel upheld the district court's stay
decision.
In Versata Software Inc. v. Callidus Software Inc., the Federal
Circuit panel had reversed a denial of a stay, finding the lower court
had misapplied the legal standard. 24 The panel found the District
Court's suggestion of "a categorical rule" disfavoring stays "if any
asserted claims are not also challenged in the CBM proceeding" was
"inappropriate., 125 Instead, stays may lie even where "some, but not
all, of the claims asserted in litigation are challenged in a CBM
120 See generally VirtualAgility, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2286.
121 See id.
122 Benefit Funding Sys. LLC, 767 F.3d at 1383.
123 Id. at 1386 (quoting Virtual Agility, 759 F.3d at 1313).
124 Versata Software Inc. v. Callidus Software Inc., 771 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
vacated as moot, No. 2014-1468 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 27, 2015) (slip op.).
125 Id. at 1371.
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review." 126  And the panel took judicial notice that the PTAB
instituted CBM review of the remaining claims in Versata's patents
during the appeal. 127 As such, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
district court had erred both under the de novo standard that might
have applied, as well as under the traditional abuse-of-discretion
standard. 128 (We note that this decision was later vacated as moot
based on a late-filed settlement agreement.)
In Intellectual Ventures H LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 2 9 a
2-1 Federal Circuit denied an appeal from a CBM-related stay as
premature where the stay motion was denied with leave to refile prior
to the Board deciding institution. Invoking the "final judgment rule,"
the majority panel, in an opinion authored by Judge O'Malley and
joined by Judge Bryson, parsed § 18, which gives the Federal Circuit
interlocutory jurisdiction over only appeals "relating to a [CBM
review] proceeding for that patent."'' 30 Over the dissent, she found
appeals over petitions did not fall within the court's interlocutory
jurisdiction under § 18; only appeals from stay motions over instituted
proceedings should be appealable. Citing the "not terribly
illuminating" legislative history,131 she construed the statute's use of
the term "proceeding" as requiring a decision on institution.
Thus, while the courts and the Federal Circuit could take judicial
notice of a proceeding granted later, it was not required to do so sua
sponte. In a long footnote 4, the majority distinguished the earlier
VirtualAgility decision, where the panel took such notice, adding "we
decline to expand the record before us."'
132
Judge Hughes, in dissent, argued that the opinion improperly
limited the Federal Circuit's review.13 3 Heavily relying on the
legislative history, he wrote that "the majority's statutory construction
was at odds with the overall purpose of the AIA and the specific
purpose of the CBM procedure."' 34 The dissent also took pains to
discuss the practical implications of the majority's opinion, by which
"district courts could make stay decisions prior to institution that are
unreviewable. And therefore we could not ensure the uniformity that
126 Id. at 1372.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 2014-1724, slip op.
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 1, 2015).
130 Id. at 7 (emphasis removed) (quoting § 18(b)(1)).
131 Id. at 9.
132 Id. at 4-5 n.4.
133 Id. at 20 (Hughes, J., dissenting).
134 Id.
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Congress so clearly intended for such decisions."'
135
In Ultratec, Inc. v. CaptionCall LLC, a unanimous Federal
Circuit panel concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over a patent
owner's appeal from the grant of a stay in favor of a pending IPR.
136
Because stay orders are generally unappealable until after a trial has
completed, and the patent owner had not shown that one of the
typical exceptions 137 applied, the court only considered the patent
owner's mandamus appeal. Noting that district courts have
"considerable leeway in the exercise of its judgment in granting a
stay" and that "guidance from related PTO proceedings can play a
critical role in determining whether to stay proceedings," the court
declined to find the requisites for the "drastic" remedy of mandamus
relief met.1 38 The court effectively found no clear abuse of discretion,
despite the district court entering a stay after the jury had found the
asserted patents valid and infringed. The court held that staying the
resolution of the fourteen pending post-trial motions was within the
district court's discretion.
In Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., the Federal Circuit considered
two appeals from the denial of a stay in favor of CBM review of an
asserted patent. The court affirmed the denial of a stay to defendant
Apple, who had already gone through a jury trial on infringement and
invalidity, but overruled the denial of a staying in the case against
defendant Samsung, whose trial was imminent, but had not yet
begun. 139 The Court concluded that the outcome of the CBM would
not simplify issues as to Apple, as the jury had already considered
invalidity and infringement of the asserted patent, despite the
necessity of a separate trial on damages issues. But with respect to
Samsung, where trial-the "most burdensome task"-was still to
come, the Federal Circuit deemed a stay appropriate. The Court
found the trial's timing "the critical distinction between the Apple and
Samsung cases," thus "affect[ing] the analysis of two of the four [stay]
factors: simplification of the issues and reduction of the burden of the
litigation on the parties and the court., 140 Thus, while courts may stay
cases in favor of CBMs very late in the district-court proceeding, they
135 Id. at 4.
136 Ultratec, Inc. v. Captioncall, LLC, No. 2015-1694,-Fed. Appx -, 2105 WL
4528272, at *1. (Fed. Cir. June 30, 2015).
137 Id. These exceptions include putting the appellant effectively "out of court,"
having the practical effect of an injunction, or triggering the collateral order doctrine.
138 Id. at *2.
139 Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., 2015 WL 4603820,-Fed. Appx. -, at *4 (July
30, 2015).
140 Id. at *9.
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may be less inclined to do so where trial has already progressed.
Time will tell whether this early trend favoring stays persists.
Given that CBM review affords broader patentability challenges than
IPR proceedings, this trend does not suggest that courts will give the
same deference to all future PTAB reviews. Indeed, as noted by
Judge Bryson, while courts have been "nearly uniform" in granting




Thanks to a spate of precedent and recent cases, seeking a stay of
district court litigation in light of an IPR or a CBM grows increasingly
predictable. Carefully looking to the cases that came before can
faithfully guide any practitioner seeking a stay. The law has been sped
along by a procedural quirk that has fed precedential decisions
quickly to the Federal Circuit. The drafters of § 18 of the AIA have
ensured us a wealth of precedent, both today and well into the future,
on what constitutes a successful stay motion. By creating an
interlocutory appeal from district court action directly to the Federal
Circuit, allowing for a de novo review, and grafting the three factors
related to all stays onto the test to be analyzed, they have quickly
created a body of precedent on what should satisfy each of the factors.
This has injected certainty, rules, and order into the stay process
and has-it seems-led to more stays being granted. This helps
businesses and practitioners determine what does-and does not-
constitute a case meriting a stay in light of a patent office proceeding.
We have the drafters of § 18 to thank.
141 Memorandum Op. and Order at 3, NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am., No. 2:13-cv-
01058-WCB, at 3 (Bryson, J., sitting by designation).
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